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Why India and Bangladesh need a new approach to transboundary rivers
South Asia is the region most vulnerable to climate change, according to the Sixth Assessment Report (2022) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Yet this vulnerability is being compounded by a rapidly growing population, poverty, poor governance, water scarcity, and transboundary water conflicts.
After South America, South Asia is home to one of the world's largest river systems, which has shaped civilisations for millennia. These rivers not only sustain the region's culture, economy and environment, but their natural flows are also fundamental to climate resilience and ecological stability. There is no doubt that climate change is placing growing pressure on these rivers by raising temperatures, accelerating the retreat of Himalayan glaciers, and intensifying monsoon rainfall. Equally important, however, are increasing conflicts over transboundary rivers and the persistent failure to view rivers as interconnected social-ecological systems. Together, these human and climatic pressures are amplifying the adverse impacts of climate change across the region.
In broad terms, social-ecological systems describe the dynamic interactions between human societies and natural ecosystems, and the deeply interconnected relationships that determine their resilience to environmental and social shocks such as climate change and pandemics. From this perspective, a river is shaped not only by climate, hydrology, land and geography, but also by governance, institutions, economic and cultural activities, and the complex interactions among them, all of which underpin people's livelihoods. While this article does not seek to provide an exhaustive roadmap for resolving transboundary water conflicts, it highlights several key reasons why rivers must be understood through a social-ecological systems lens if we are to address the climate crisis effectively.
The second dimension is institutional hydro-coercion, which operates through procedural manipulation, bargaining power, and what can be described as institutional stalling. The prolonged stalemate over the Teesta River is a clear instance of this strategy. Although an agreement was nearly finalised in 2011, it has been blocked for over a decade by the state government of West Bengal. This subnational veto allows the Indian federal government to avoid accountability for diplomatic failure while implicitly using the unresolved issue as leverage. This manufactured scarcity is a deliberate strategic delay in which non-decision and silence are weaponised as forms of structural power. By keeping Bangladesh in a state of perpetual negotiation and vulnerability, India maintains an advantageous position that pressures our nation into broader strategic alignment.
The consequences of these coercive practices are not abstract theories but lived realities of pervasive precarity for millions of Bangladeshis. The diversion of the Ganges has led to severe salinity intrusion in our coastal regions, devastating agricultural lands and compromising potable water sources. This ecological degradation directly threatens the Sundarbans, which is the world's largest mangrove forest and our primary defence against climate-induced cyclones. In the north, the lack of predictable flow from the Teesta has led to the collapse of traditional livelihoods in fishing and agriculture. These disruptions drive internal migration and displacement, as rural communities are forced to abandon their ancestral lands for the precarious life of urban slums. This displacement is a form of structural violence, where hegemonic control over water fuels the redrafting of the social fabric of our nation.
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